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Abstract
Elections seem simple—aren’t they just counting? But they have
a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy require-
ments. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate
needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of
the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time
is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and main-
tainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers.
It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning
theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable se-
curity, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts:
convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which
amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about
how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We
examine how current systems walk this tightrope.
1. Introduction: What is the evidence?
The Russians did three things . . . The third is that they tried, and
they were not successful, but they still tried, to get access to
voting machines and vote counting software, to play with the
results
Former CIA Acting Director Michael Morell, Mar. 15, 2017
These are baseless allegations substantiated with nothing, done
on a rather amateurish, emotional level
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Jan. 9, 2017
It would take an army to hack into our voting system.
Tom Hicks, EAC Commissioner, Oct. 6, 2016
It is not enough for an election to produce the correct outcome.
The electorate must also be convinced that the announced result
reflects the will of the people. And for a rational person to be
convinced requires evidence.
Modern technology—computer and communications systems—
is fragile and vulnerable to programming errors and undetectable
manipulation. No current system that relies on electronic technology
alone to capture and tally votes can provide convincing evidence
that election results are accurate without endangering or sacrificing
the anonymity of votes.1
1Moreover, the systems that come closest are not readily usable by
a typical voter.
Paper ballots, on the other hand, have some very helpful security
properties: they are readable (and countable, and re-countable) by
humans; they are relatively durable; and they are tamper-evident.
Votes cast on paper can be counted using electronic technology; then
the accuracy of the count can be checked manually to ensure that the
technology functioned adequately well. Statistical methods allow
the accuracy of the count to be assessed by examining only a fraction
of the ballots manually, often a very small fraction. If there is also
convincing evidence that the collection of ballots has been conserved
(no ballots added, lost, or modified) then this combination—voter-
verifiable paper ballots, a mechanized count, and a manual check of
the accuracy of that count—can provide convincing evidence that
announced electoral outcomes are correct.
Conversely, absent convincing evidence that the paper trail has
been conserved, a manual double-check of electronic results against
the paper trail will not be convincing. If the paper trail has been
conserved adequately, then a full manual tally of the ballots can
correct the electronic count if the electronic count is incorrect.
These considerations have led many election integrity advocates
to push for a voter-verifiable paper trail (VVPAT).2
In the 2016 presidential election, about three quarters of Amer-
icans voted using systems that generated voter-verifiable paper
records. The aftermath of the election proved that even if 100% of
voters had used such systems, it would not have sufficed to provide
convincing evidence that the reported results are accurate.
• No state has (or had) adequate laws or regulations to ensure
that the paper trail is conserved adequately, and that provide
evidence to that effect.
• No state had laws or regulations that provided adequate manual
scrutiny of the paper to ensure that the electronically generated
results are correct; most still do not.
• Many states that have a paper trail also have laws that make
it hard for anyone to check the results using the paper trail—
even candidates with war chests for litigation. Not only can
other candidates fight attempts to check the results, the states
themselves can fight such attempts. This treats the paper as a
nuisance, rather than a safeguard.
The bottom line is that the paper trail is not worth the paper it’s
printed on. Clearly this must change.
Other techniques like software independence and end-to-end veri-
fiability can offer far greater assurance in the accuracy of an elec-
tion’s outcome, but these methods have not been broadly applied.
2Voter-marked paper ballots or ballots marked using a ballot-
marking device are preferable to VVPAT, a cash-register style print-
out that the voter cannot touch.
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1.1 Why so hard?
Several factors make it difficult to generate convincing evidence
that reported results are correct. The first is the trust model.
No one is trusted In any significant election, voters, election
officials, and equipment and software cannot necessarily be trusted
by anyone with a stake in the outcome. Voters, operators, system
designers, manufacturers, and external parties are all potential ad-
versaries.
The need for evidence Because officials and equipment may not
be trustworthy, elections should be evidence-based. Any observer
should be able to verify the reported results based on trustworthy
evidence from the voting system. Many in-person voting systems
fail to provide sufficient evidence; and as we shall see Internet
systems scarcely provide any at all.
The secret ballot Perhaps the most distinctive element of elec-
tions is the secret ballot, a critical safeguard that defends against
vote selling and voter coercion. In practical terms, voters should
not be able to prove how they voted to anyone, even if they wish
to do so. This restricts the types of evidence that can be produced
by the voting system. Encryption alone is not sufficient, since the
voters may choose to reveal their selections in response to bribery
or coercion.
The challenge of voting is thus to use fragile technology to pro-
duce trustworthy, convincing evidence of the correctness of the
outcome while protecting voter privacy in a world where no person
or machine may be trusted. The resulting voting system and its
security features must also be usable by regular voters.
The aim of this paper is to explain the important requirements of
secure elections and the solutions already available from e-voting
research, then to identify the most important directions for research.
Prior to delving into our discussion, we need to make a distinction
in terminology. Pollsite voting systems are those in which voters
record and cast ballots at predetermined locations, often in public
areas with strict monitoring. Remote voting refers to a system where
voters fill out ballots anywhere, and then send them to a central
location to cast them, either physically mailing them in the case
of vote-by-mail, or sending them over the Internet in the case of
Internet voting.
The next section defines the requirements, beginning with no-
tions of election evidence, then considering privacy, and concluding
with more general usability and security requirements. Section 3
describes the cryptographic, statistical, and engineering tools that
have been developed for designing voting systems with verifiably
correct election outcomes. Section 4 discusses the challenge of
satisfying our requirements for security using the tools presented in
real-world election systems. Section 5 concludes with the promise
and problems associated with Internet voting.
2. Requirements for Secure Voting
Trustworthiness before trust
Onora O’Neill
2.1 Trust, Verifiability, and Evidence
For an election to be accepted as legitimate, the outcome should
be convincing to all—and in particular to the losers—leaving no
valid grounds to challenge the outcome. Whether elections are
conducted by counting paper ballots by hand or using computer
technology, the possibility of error or fraud necessitates assurances
of the accuracy of the outcome.
It is clear that a naive introduction of computers into voting
introduces the possibility of wholesale and largely undetectable
fraud. If we can’t detect it, how can we prevent it?
2.1.1 Risk-Limiting Audits
Statistical post-election audits provide assurance that a reported
outcome is correct, by examining some or all of an audit trail consist-
ing of durable, tamper-evident, voter-verifiable records. Typically
the audit trail consists of paper ballots.
The outcome of an election is the set of winners. An outcome is
incorrect if it differs from the set of winners output by a perfectly
accurate manual tabulation of the audit trail.
Definition 1. An audit of an election contest is a risk-limiting
audit (RLA) with risk limit α if it has the following two properties:
1. If the reported contest outcome under audit is incorrect, the
probability that the audit leads to correcting the outcome is at
least 1−α .
2. The audit never indicates a need to alter a reported outcome
that is correct.
(In this context, “correct” means “what a full manual tally of the
paper trail would show.” If the paper trail is unreliable, a RLA in gen-
eral cannot detect that. RLAs should be preceded by “compliance
audits” that check whether the audit trail itself is adequately reliable
to determine who won.) Together, these two properties imply that
post-RLA, either the reported set of winners is the set that a perfectly
accurate hand count of the audit trail would show, or an event with
probability no larger than α has occurred. (That event is that the
outcome was incorrect, but the RLA did not lead to correcting the
outcome.) RLAs amount to a limited form of probabilistic error
correction: by relying on appropriate random sampling of the audit
trail and hypothesis tests, they have a known minimum probability
of correcting the outcome. They are not designed to ensure that the
reported numerical tally is correct, only that the outcome is correct.
The following procedure is a trivial RLA: with probability 1−α ,
perform a full manual tally of the audit trail. Amend the outcome
to match the set of winners the full hand count shows if that set is
different.
The art in constructing RLAs consists of maintaining the risk
limit while performing less work than a full hand count when the
outcome is correct. Typically, this involves framing the audit as
a sequential test of the statistical hypothesis that the outcome is
incorrect. To reject that hypothesis is to conclude that the outcome
is correct. RLAs have been developed for majority contests, plu-
rality contests, and vote-for-k contests and complex social choice
functions including D’Hondt and other proportional representation
rules—see below. RLAs have also been devised to check more than
one election contest simultaneously [99].
2.1.2 Software Independence
Rivest and Wack introduced a definition targeted specifically at
detecting misbehavior in computer-based elections:
Definition 2. [81] A voting system is software independent if
an undetected change or error in its software cannot cause an unde-
tectable change or error in an election outcome.
Software independence clearly expresses that it should not be
necessary to trust software to determine election outcomes, but it
does not say what procedures or types of evidence should be trusted
instead. A system that is not software independent cannot produce
a convincing evidence trail, but neither can a paper-based system
that does not ensure that the paper trail is complete and intact, a
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cryptographic voting system that relies on an invalid cryptographic
assumption, or a system that relies on audit procedures but lacks a
means of assuring that those procedures are properly followed. We
could likewise demand independence of many other kinds of trust as-
sumptions: hardware, paper chain-of-custody, cryptographic setup,
computational hardness, procedures, good randomness generation
etc.
Rivest and Wack also define a stronger form of the property that
includes error recovery:
Definition 3. [81] A voting system is strongly software inde-
pendent if it is software independent and a detected change or error
in an election outcome (due to the software) can be corrected without
rerunning the election.
A strongly software-independent system can recover from soft-
ware errors or bugs, but that recovery in turn is generally based on
some other trail of evidence.
A software independent system can be viewed as a form of tamper-
evident system: a material software problem leaves a detectable
trace. Strongly software independent systems are resilient: not only
do material software problems leave a trace, the overall election
system can recover from a detected problem.
One mechanism to provide software independence is to record
votes on a paper record that provides physical evidence of voter’s
intent, can be inspected by the voter prior to casting the vote, and—if
preserved intact—can later be manually audited to check the election
outcome. Risk-limiting audits (see Section 3.2) can then achieve
a pre-specified level of assurance that results are correct; machine
assisted risk-limiting audits [23], can help minimize the amount of
labor required for legacy systems that do not provide a cast-vote
record for every ballot, linked to the corresponding ballot.
Open problems:
• How can systems handle errors in the event that elections
don’t verify? Can they recover?
2.1.3 End-to-end verifiability
The concern regarding fraud and desire for transparency has mo-
tivated the security and crypto communities to develop another ap-
proach to voting system assurance: end-to-end verifiability (E2E-V).
An election that is end-to-end verifiable achieves software indepen-
dence together with the analagous notion of hardware independence
as well as independence from actions of election personnel and
vendors. Rather than attempting to verify thousands of lines of code
or closely monitor all of the many processes in an election, E2E-V
focuses on providing a means to detect errors or fraud in the process
of voting and counting. The idea behind E2E-V is to enable voters
themselves to monitor the integrity of the election; democracy for
the people by the people, as it were. This is challenging because
total transparency is not possible without undermining the secret
ballot, hence the mechanisms to generate such evidence have to be
carefully designed.
Definition 4. (adapted from [16]) A voting system is end-to-end
verifiable if it has the following three kinds of verifiability:
• Cast as intended: Voters can independently verify that their
selections are correctly recorded.
• Collected as cast: Voters can independently verify that the
representation of their vote is correctly collected in the tally.
• Tallied as collected: Anyone can verify that every well-formed,
collected vote is correctly included in the tally.
If verification relies on trusting entities, software, or hardware, the
voter and/or auditor should be able to choose them freely. Trusted
procedures, if there are any, must be open to meaningful observation
by every voter.
Note that the above definition allows each voter to check that her
vote is correctly collected, thus ensuring that attempts to change or
delete cast votes are detected. In addition, it should also be possible
to check the list of voters who cast ballots, to ensure that votes are
not added to the collection (i.e., to prevent ballot-box stuffing). This
is called eligibility verifiability [65, 96].
2.1.4 Collection Accountability
In an E2E-V election protocol, voters can check whether their
votes have been properly counted, but if they discover a problem,
there may not be adequate evidence to correct it. An election system
that is collection-accountable provides voters with evidence of any
failure to collect their votes.
Definition 5. An election system is collection accountable if
any voter who detects that her vote has not been collected has, as
part of the vote-casting protocol, convincing evidence that can be
presented to an independent party to demonstrate that the vote has
not been collected.
Another form of evidence involves providing each voter with a
code representing her votes, such that knowledge of a correct code
is evidence of casting a particular vote [31]. Yet another mechanism
is a suitable paper receipt. Forensic analysis may provide evidence
that this receipt was not forged by a voter [13, 9].
Open problems:
• Can independently verifiable evidence be provided by the
voting system for incorrect ballot casting?
2.1.5 Dispute Resolution
While accountability helps secure the election process, it is not
very useful if there is no way to handle disputes. If a voter claims,
on the basis of accountability checks provided by a system, that
something has gone wrong, there needs to be a mechanism to address
this. This is known as dispute resolution:
Definition 6. [58] A voting system is said to have dispute reso-
lution if, when there is a dispute between two participants regarding
honest participation, a third party can correctly resolve the dispute.
An alternative to dispute resolution is dispute-freeness:
Definition 7. [62] A dispute-free voting system has built-in pre-
vention mechanisms that eliminate disputes among the active partic-
ipants; any third party can check whether an active participant has
cheated.
Open problems:
• Can effective dispute resolution for all classes of possible
errors exist in a given system?
• Are there other reasonable definitions and mechanisms for
dispute resolution?
• Can a system offer complete dispute resolution capabilities
in which every dispute can be adjudicated using evidence
produced by the election system?
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2.1.6 From Verifiable to Verified
Constructing a voting system that creates sufficient evidence to
reveal problems is not enough on its own. That evidence must
actually be used—and used appropriately—to ensure the accuracy
of election outcomes.
An election result may not be verified, even if it is generated by
an end-to-end verifiable voting system. For verification of the result,
we need several further conditions to be satisfied:
• Enough voters and observers must be sufficiently diligent in
performing the appropriate checks.
• Random audits (including those initiated by voters) must be
sufficiently extensive and unpredictable that changes that affect
election outcomes have a high chance of being detected.
• If checks fail, this must be reported to the authorities who, in
turn, must take appropriate action.
These issues involve complex human factors, including voters’ in-
centives to participate in verification. Little work has been done on
this aspect of the problem.
An E2E-V system might give an individual voter assurance that
her vote has not been tampered with if that voter performs certain
checks. However, sufficiently many voters must do this in order to
provide evidence that the election outcome as a whole is correct.
Combining risk-limiting audits with E2E-V systems can provide a
valuable layer of protection in the case that an insufficient number
of voters participate in verification.
Finally, another critical verification problem that has received
little attention to date is how to make schemes that are recoverable
in the face of errors. We do not want to have to abort and rerun an
election every time a check a fails. Certain levels of detected errors
can be shown to be highly unlikely if the outcome is incorrect, and
hence can be tolerated. Other types and patterns of error cast doubt
on the outcome and may require either full inspection or retabulation
of the paper trail or, if the paper trail cannot be relied upon, a new
election.
Both Küsters et al. [67] and Kiayias et al. [64] model voter-
initiated auditing [12] and its implications for detection of an incor-
rect election result. Both definitions turn uncertainty about voter
initiated auditing into a bound on the probability of detecting devia-
tions of the announced election result from the truth.
Open problems:
• Can systems be designed so that the extent and diligence of
checks performed can be measured?
• Can verification checks be abstracted from voters, either by
embedding them in election processes or automating them?
2.2 Voter Authentication
A significant challenge for election systems is the credentialing
of voters to ensure that all eligible voters, and no one else, can cast
votes. This presents numerous questions: what kinds of credentials
should be used? How should they be issued? Can they be revoked
or de-activated? Are credentials good for a single election or for
an extended period? How difficult are they to share, transfer, steal,
or forge? Can the ability to create genuine-looking forgeries help
prevent coercion? These questions must be answered carefully, and
until they are satisfied for remote voting, pollsite voting is the only
robust way to address these questions—and even then, in-person
credentialing is subject to forgery, distribution, and revocation con-
cerns (for instance, the Dominican Republic recently held a pollsite
election where voters openly sold their credentials [47]). In the U.S.,
there is concern that requiring in-person credentialing, in the form
of voter ID, disenfranchises legitimate voters.
Open problems:
• Is there a sufficiently secure way credential Internet voting?
• Can a traditional PKI ensure eligibility for remote voting?
• How does use of a PKI change coercion assumptions?
2.3 Privacy, Receipt Freeness, and Coercion
Resistance
In most security applications, privacy and confidentiality are syn-
onymous. In elections, however, privacy has numerous components
that go well beyond typical confidentiality. Individual privacy can be
compromised by “normal” election processes such as a unanimous
result. Voters may be coerced if they can produce a proof of how
they voted, even if they have to work to do so.
Privacy for votes is a means to an end: if voters don’t express
their true preferences then the election may not produce the right
outcome. This section gives an overview of increasingly strong
definitions of what it means for voters to be free of coercion.
2.3.1 Basic Confidentiality
We will take ballot privacy to mean that the election does not
leak any information about how any voter voted beyond what can be
deduced from the announced results. Confidentiality is not the only
privacy requirement in elections, but even simple confidentiality
poses significant challenges. It is remarkable how many deployed
e-voting systems have been shown to lack even the most basic
confidentiality properties (e.g., [54, 46, 27, 24, 71]).
Perhaps more discouraging to basic privacy is the fact that remote
voting systems (both paper and electronic) inherently allow voters
to eschew confidentiality. Because remote systems enable voters to
fill out their ballots outside a controlled environment, anyone can
watch over the voter’s shoulder while she fills out her ballot.
In an election—unlike, say, in a financial transaction—even the
candidate receiving an encrypted vote should not be able to decrypt
it. Instead, an encrypted (or otherwise shrouded) vote must remain
confidential to keep votes from being directly visible to election
authorities.
Some systems, such as code voting [30] and the Norwegian and
Swiss Internet voting schemes, defend privacy against an attacker
who controls the computer used for voting; however, this relies on
assumptions about the privacy and integrity of the code sheet. Some
schemes, such as JCJ/Civitas [57], obscure who has voted while
providing a proof that only eligible votes were included in the tally.
Several works [40] [67], following Benaloh [18] formalize the
notion of privacy as preventing an attacker from noticing when two
parties swap their votes.
Open problems:
• Can we develop more effective, verifiable forms of assurance
that vote privacy is preserved?
• Can we build means of privacy for remote voting through
computer-based systems?
2.3.2 Everlasting Privacy
Moran and Naor expressed concern over what might happen to
encrypted votes that can still be linked to their voter’s name some
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decades into the future, and hence decrypted by superior technology.
They define a requirement to prevent this:
Definition 8. [72] A voting scheme has everlasting privacy if its
privacy does not depend on assumptions of cryptographic hardness.
Their solution uses perfectly hiding commitments to the votes,
which are aggregated homomorphically. Instead of privacy depend-
ing upon a cryptographic hardness assumption, it is the integrity of
an election that depends upon a hardness assumption; and only a
real-time compromise of the assumption can have an impact.
2.3.3 Systemic Privacy Loss
We generally accept that without further information, a voter is
more likely to have voted for a candidate who has received more
votes, but additional data is commonly released which can further
erode voter privacy. Even if we exclude privacy compromises, there
are other privacy risks which must be managed. If voters achieve
privacy by encrypting their selections, the holders of decryption
keys can view their votes. If voters make their selections on devices
out of their immediate control (e.g. official election equipment),
then it is difficult to assure them that these devices are not retaining
information that could later compromise their privacy. If voters
make their selections on their own devices, then there is an even
greater risk that these devices could be infected with malware that
records (and perhaps even alters) their selections (see, for instance,
the Estonian system [97]).
Open problems:
• Are there ways to quantify systemic privacy loss?
• Can elections minimize privacy loss?
• Can elections provide verifiable integrity while minimizing
privacy loss?
2.3.4 Receipt-freeness
Preventing coercion and vote-selling was considered solved with
the introduction of the Australian ballot. The process of voting pri-
vately within a public environment where privacy can be monitored
and enforced prevents improper influence. Recent systems have
complicated this notion, however. If a voting protocol provides a
receipt but is not carefully designed, the receipt can be a channel for
information to the coercive adversary.
Benaloh and Tuinstra [17] pointed out that passive privacy is
insufficient for resisting coercion in elections:
Definition 9. A voting system is receipt free if a voter is unable
to prove how she voted even if she actively colludes with a coercer
and deviates from the protocol in order to try to produce a proof.
Traditional elections may fail receipt-freeness too. In general,
if a vote consists of a long list of choices, the number of possible
votes may be much larger than the number of likely voters. This
is sometimes called (a failure of) the short ballot assumption [84].
Prior to each election, coercers assign a particular voting pattern
to each voter. When the individual votes are made public, any
voter who did not cast their pattern can then be found out. This is
sometimes called the Italian attack, after a once prevalent practice
in Sicily. It can be easily mitigated when a vote can be broken up,
but is difficult to mitigate in systems like IRV in which the vote is
complex but must be kept together. Mitigations are discussed in
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.5.
Incoercibility has been defined and examined in the universally
composable framework in the context of general multiparty computa-
tion [25, 105]. These definitions sidestep the question of whether the
voting function itself allows coercion (by publishing individual com-
plex ballots, or by revealing a unanimous result for example)—they
examine whether the protocol introduces additional opportunities
for coercion. With some exceptions (such as [7]), they usually focus
on a passive notion of receipt-freeness, which is not strong enough
for voting.
2.3.5 Coercion Resistance
Schemes can be receipt-free, but not entirely resistant to coercion.
Schemes like Prêt à Voter [87] that rely on randomization for receipt-
freeness can be susceptible to forced randomization, where a coercer
forces a voter to always choose the first choice on the ballot. Due
to randomized candidate order, the resulting vote will be randomly
distributed. If a specific group of voters are coerced in this way, it
can have a disproportionate impact on the election outcome.
If voting rolls are public and voting is not mandatory, this has
an effect equivalent to prevent forced abstention, wherein a coercer
refuses to let a voter vote. Schemes that rely on credentialing are
also susceptible to coercion by forced surrender of credentials.
One way to fully resist forced abstention is to obscure who voted.
However, this is difficult to reconcile with the opportunity to verify
that only eligible voters have voted (eligibility verifiability), though
some schemes achieve both [53].
Moran and Naor [72] provide a strong definition of receipt free-
ness in which a voter may deviate actively from the protocol in order
to convince a coercer that she obeyed. Their model accommodates
forced randomization. A scheme is resistant to coercion if the voter
can always pretend to have obeyed while actually voting as she
likes.
Definition 10. A voting scheme is coercion resistant if there
exists a way for a coerced voter to cast her vote such that her co-
ercer cannot distinguish whether or not she followed the coercer’s
instructions.
Coercion resistance is defined in [57] to include receipt freeness
and defence against forced-randomization, forced abstention and
the forced surrender of credentials. More general definitions include
[68], which incorporates all these attacks along with Moran and
Naor’s notion of a coercion resistance strategy.
Note that if the coercer can monitor the voter throughout the
vote casting period, then resistance is futile. For in-person voting,
we assume that the voter is isolated from any coercer while she
is in the booth (although this is questionable in the era of mobile
phones). For remote voting, we need to assume that voters will have
some time when they can interact with the voting system (or the
credential-granting system) unobserved.
2.3.6 More Coercion Considerations
Some authors have tried to provide some protection against co-
ercion without achieving full coercion resistance. Caveat coerci-
tor [51] proposes the notion of coercion evidence and allows voters
to cast multiple votes using the same credential.
Open problem:
• Can we design usable, verifiable, coercion-resistant voting
for a remote setting?
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2.4 Availability
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is an ever-present threat to elections
which can be mitigated but never fully eliminated. A simple service
outage can disenfranchise voters, and the threat of attack from
foreign state-level adversaries is a pressing concern. Indeed, one of
the countries that regularly uses Internet voting, Estonia, has been
subject to malicious outages [104].
A variant of DoS specific to the context of elections is selective
DoS, which presents a fundamentally different threat than general
DoS. Voting populations are rarely homogeneous, and disruption
of service, for instance, in urban (or rural) areas can skew results
and potentially change election outcomes. If DoS cannot be entirely
eliminated, can service standards be prescribed so that if an outcome
falls below the standards it is vacated? Should these standards be
dependent on the reported margin of victory? What, if any, recovery
methods are possible? Because elections are more vulnerable to
minor perturbations than most other settings, selective DoS is a
concern which cannot be ignored.
2.5 Usability
A voting system must be usable by voters, poll-workers, election
officials, observers, and so on. Voters who may not be computer
literate—and sometimes not literate at all—should be able to vote
with very low error rates. Although some error is regarded as
inevitable, it is also critical that the interface not drive errors in a
particular direction. For instance, a list of candidates that crosses
a page boundary could cause the candidates on the second page to
be missed. Whatever security mechanisms we add to the voting
process should operate without degrading usability, otherwise the
resulting system will likely be unacceptable. A full treatment of
usability in voting is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we
note that E2E-V systems (and I-voting systems, even when not E2E-
V) add additional processes for voters and poll workers to follow.
If verification processes can’t be used properly by real voters, the
outcome will not be properly verified. One great advantage of
statistical audits is to shift complexity from voters to auditors.
Open problems:
• How effectively can usability be integrated into the design
process of a voting system?
• How can we ensure full E2E-V, coercion resistance, etc., in
a usable fashion?
2.6 Local Regulatory Requirements
A variety of other mechanical requirements are often imposed by
legal requirements that vary among jurisdictions. For example:
• Allowing voters to “write-in” vote for a candidate not listed on
the ballot.
• Mandating the use of paper ballots (in some states without
unique identifying marks or serial numbers; in other states
requiring such marks)
• Mandating the use of certain social choice functions (see 2.6.1
Complex Election Methods below).
• Supporting absentee voting.
• Requiring or forbidding that “ballot rotation” be used (listing
the candidates in different orders in different jurisdictions).
• Requiring that voting equipment be certified under government
guidelines.
Newer electronic and I-voting systems raise important policy
challenges for real-world adoption. For example, in STAR-Vote [9],
there will be multiple copies of every vote record: mostly electronic
records, but also paper records. There may be instances where one is
damaged or destroyed and the other is all that remains. When laws
speak to retention of “the ballot”, that term is no longer well-defined.
Such requirements may need to be adapted to newer voting systems.
2.6.1 Complex Election Methods
Many countries allow voters to select, score, or rank candidates
or parties. Votes can then be tallied in a variety of complex ways [21,
90]. None of the requirements for privacy, coercion-resistance, or the
provision of verifiable evidence change. However, many tools that
achieve these properties for traditional "first-past-the-post" elections
need to be redesigned.
An election method might be complex at the voting or the tallying
end. For example, party-list methods such as D’Hondt and Sainte-
Laguë have simple voting, in which voters select their candidate
or party, but complex proportional seat allocation. Borda, Range
Voting, and Approval Voting allow votes to be quite expressive but
are simple to tally by addition. Condorcet’s method and related
functions [94, 103] can be arbitrarily complex, as they can combine
with any social choice function. Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) and the
Single Transferable Vote (STV) are both expressive and complicated
to tally. This makes for several challenges.
Open problem:
• Which methods for cast-as-intended verification (e.g. code
voting [30]) work for complex voting schemes?
• How can we apply Risk-limiting audits to complex schemes?
See Section 3.2.1 for more detail.
• How can failures of the short ballot assumption [84] be
mitigated with complex ballots?
• Can we achieve everlasting privacy for complex elections?
3. How can we secure voting?
These truths are self-evident but not self-enforcing
Barack Obama
The goal of this section and the next is to provide a state-of-the-art
picture of current solutions to voting problems and ongoing voting
research, to motivate further work on open problems, and to define
clear directions both in research and election policy.
3.1 The Role of Paper and Ceremonies
Following security problems with direct-recording electronic vot-
ing systems (DREs) [71, 24, 46, 107], many parts of the USA
returned to the use of paper ballots. If secure custody of the pa-
per ballots is assumed, paper provides durable evidence required
to determine the correctness of the election outcome. For this rea-
son, when humans vote from untrusted computers, cryptographic
voting system specifications often use paper for security, included
in the notions of dispute-freeness, dispute resolution, collection
accountability and accountability [66] (all as defined in Section 2.1).
Note that the standard approach to dispute resolution, based on
non-repudiation, cannot be applied to the voting problem in the stan-
dard fashion, because the human voter does not have the ability to
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check digital signatures or digitally sign the vote (or other messages
that may be part of the protocol) unassisted.
Dispute-freeness or accountability are often achieved in a polling
place through the use of cast paper ballots, and the evidence of
their chain of custody (e.g., wet-ink signatures). Paper provides an
interface for data entry for the voter—not simply to enter the vote,
but also to enter other messages that the protocol might require—
and data on unforgeable paper serves many of the purposes of
digitally signed data. Thus, for example, when a voter marks a
Prêt à Voter [87] or Scantegrity [31] ballot, she is providing an
instruction that the voting system cannot pretend was something
else. The resulting vote encryption has been physically committed to
by the voting system—by the mere act of printing the ballot—before
the voter “casts” her vote.
Physical ceremony, such as can be witnessed while the election is
ongoing, also supports verifiable cryptographic election protocols
(see Section 3.3.2). Such ceremonies include the verification of voter
credentials, any generation of randomness if required for the choice
between cast and audit, any vote-encryption-verification performed
by election officials, etc.
The key aspect of these ceremonies is the chance for observers to
see that they are properly conducted.
Open problem:
• Can we achieve dispute-resolution or -freeness without the
use of paper and physical ceremony?
3.2 Statistics and Auditing
Two types of Risk Limiting Audits have been devised: ballot
polling and comparison [69, 14, 98]. Both types continue to exam-
ine random samples of ballots until either there is strong statistical
evidence that the outcome is correct, or until there has been a com-
plete manual tally. “Strong statistical evidence” means that the
p-value of the hypothesis that the outcome is incorrect is at most α ,
within tolerable risk.
Both methods rely on the existence of a ballot manifest that
describes how the audit trail is stored. Selecting the random sample
can include a public ceremony in which observers contribute by
rolling dice to seed a PRNG [36].
Ballot-polling audits examine random samples of individual bal-
lots. They demand almost nothing of the voting technology other
than the reported outcome. When the reported outcome is correct,
the expected number of ballots a ballot-polling audit inspects is
approximately quadratic in the reciprocal of the (true) margin of
victory, resulting in large expected sample sizes for small margins.
Comparison audits compare reported results for randomly se-
lected subsets of ballots to manual tallies of those ballots. Compari-
son audits require the voting system to commit to tallies of subsets
of ballots (“clusters”) corresponding to identifiable physical subsets
of the audit trail. Comparison audits have two parts: confirm that
the outcome computed from the commitment matches the reported
outcome, and check the accuracy of randomly selected clusters by
manually inspecting the corresponding subsets of the audit trail.
When the reported cluster tallies are correct, the number of clusters
a comparison audit inspects is approximately linear in the reciprocal
of the reported margin. The efficiency of comparison audits also de-
pends approximately linearly on the size of the clusters. Efficiency
is highest for clusters consisting of individual ballots: individual
cast vote records. To audit at the level of individual ballots requires
the voting system to commit to the interpretation of each ballot in a
way that is linked to the corresponding element of the audit trail.
In addition to RLAs, auditing methods have been proposed with
Bayesian [83] or heuristic [82] justifications.
All post-election audits implicitly assume that the audit trail is
adequately complete and accurate that a full manual count would
reflect the correct contest outcome. Compliance audits are designed
to determine whether there is convincing evidence that the audit trail
was curated well, by checking ballot accounting, registration records,
pollbooks, election procedures, physical security of the audit trail,
chain of custody logs, and so on. Evidence-based elections [101]
combine compliance audits and risk-limiting audits to determine
whether the audit trail is adequately accurate, and if so, whether the
reported outcome is correct. If there is not convincing evidence that
the audit trail is adequately accurate and complete, there cannot be
convincing evidence that the outcome is correct.
3.2.1 Audits in Complex Elections
Generally, in traditional and complex elections, whenever an
election margin is known and the infrastructure for a comparison
audit is available, it is possible to conduct a rigorous risk-limiting
comparison audit. This motivates many works on practical margin
computation for IRV [70, 28, 93, 20].
However, such an audit for a complex election may not be effi-
cient, which motivates the extension of Stark’s sharper discrepancy
measure to D’Hondt and related schemes [100]. For Schulze and
some related schemes, neither efficient margin computation nor any
other form of RLA is known (see [55]); a Bayesian audit [83, 33]
may nonetheless be used when one is able to specify suitable priors.
Open problems:
• Can comparison audits for complex ballots be performed
without exposing voters to “Italian” attacks?
• Can RLAs or other sound statistical audits be developed for
systems too complex to compute margins efficiently?
• Can the notion of RLAs be extended to situations where
physical evidence is not available (i.e. Internet voting)?
3.3 Cryptographic Tools and Designs
3.3.1 Major Approaches to Voting Cryptography
Typically E2E-V involves providing each voter with a protected
receipt—an encrypted or encoded version of their vote—at the time
the vote is cast. The voter can later use her receipt to check whether
her vote is included correctly in the tabulation process. Furthermore,
given the set of encrypted votes (as well as other relevant informa-
tion, like the public keys), the tabulation is universally verifiable:
anyone can check whether it is correct. To achieve this, most E2E-V
systems rely on a public bulletin board, where the set of encrypted
ballots is published in an append-only fashion.
The votes can then be turned into a tally in one of two main
ways. Homomorphic encryption schemes [35, 18] allow the tally
to be produced on encrypted votes. Verifiable shuffling transforms
a list of encrypted votes into a shuffled list that can be decrypted
without the input votes being linked to the (decrypted) output. There
are efficient ways to prove that the input list exactly matches the
output [91, 76, 102, 8, 52].
3.3.2 Techniques for Cast-as-Intended Verification
How can a voter verify that her cast vote is the one she wanted?
Code Voting, first introduced by Chaum [30], gives each voter a
sheet of codes for each candidate. Assuming the code sheet is valid,
the voter can cast a vote on an untrusted machine by entering the
code corresponding to her chosen candidate and waiting to receive
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the correct confirmation code. Modern interpretations of code voting
include [108, 56, 86].
Code voting only provides assurance that the correct voting code
reached the server, it does not of itself provide any guarantees that
the code will subsequently be correctly counted. A scheme that im-
proves on this is Pretty Good Democracy [89], where knowledge of
the codes is threshold shared in such a way that receipt of the correct
confirmation code provides assurance that the voting code has been
registered on the bulletin board by a threshold set of trustees, and
hence subsequently counted.
The alternative is to ask the machine to encrypt a vote directly,
but verify that it does so correctly. Benaloh [11] developed a simple
protocol to enable vote encryption on an untrusted voting machine.
A voter uses a voting machine to encrypt any number of votes, and
casts only one of these encrypted votes. All the other votes may
be “audited” by the voter. If the encryption is audited, the voting
system provides a proof that it encrypted the vote correctly, and
the proof is public. The corresponding ballot cannot be cast as
the correspondence between the encryption and the ballot is now
public, and the vote is no longer secret. Voters take home receipts
corresponding to the encryptions of their cast ballots as well as
any ballots that are to be audited. They may check the presence of
these on a bulletin board, and the correctness proofs of the audited
encryptions using software obtained from any of several sources.
However, even the most dilligent voters need only check that their
receipts match the public record and that any ballots selected for
audit display correct candidate selections. The correctness proofs
are part of the public record that can be verified by any individual
or observer that is verifying correct tallying.
3.3.3 Formal models and security analyses of cast-
as-intended verification protocols
In addition to the work of Adida on assisted-human interactive
proofs (AHIPs, see [1]), there has been some work on a rigorous un-
derstanding of one or more properties of single protocols, including
the work of Moran and Naor [74, 73] and Küsters et al. [66].
There have also been formalizations of voting protocols with
human participants, such as by Moran and Naor [73] (for a polling
protocol using tamper-evident seals on envelopes) and Kiayias et
al. [63]. However, there is no one model that is sufficient for the
rigorous understanding of the prominent protocols used/proposed
for use in real elections. The absence of proofs has led to the
overlooking of vulnerabilities in the protocols in the past, see [59,
61, 60, 50].
Many systems use a combination of paper, cryptography, and
auditing to achieve E2E-V in the polling place, including Mark-
pledge [77, 4], Wombat [85, 10], Demos [64], Prêt à Voter [87],
STAR-Vote [9], and Moran and Naor’s scheme [72]. Their proper-
ties are summarised more thoroughly in the following section.
The cryptographic literature has numerous constructions of end-
to-end verifiable election schemes (e.g., [48, 78, 87, 26, 84, 77, 85,
92, 9, 56]). There are also detailed descriptions of what it means to
verify the correctness of the output of E2E-V systems (e.g., [64, 17,
72]). Others have attempted to define alternative forms of the E2E-V
properties [79, 37, 66]. There are also less technical explanations of
E2E-V intended for voters and election officials [16, 106].
Open problem:
• Can we develop a rigorous model for humans and the use of
paper and ceremonies in cryptographic voting protocols?
• Can we rigorously examine the combination of statistical
and cryptographic methods for election verification?
3.3.4 Techniques for Coercion Resistance
Some simple approaches to coercion resistance have been sug-
gested in the literature. These include allowing multiple votes with
only the last counting and allowing in-person voting to override
remotely cast votes (both used in Estonian, Norwegian, and Utah
elections [97, 49, 19]). It is not clear that this mitigates coercion at
all. Alarm codes can also be provided to voters: seemingly real but
actually fake election credentials, along with the ability for voters
to create their own fake credentials. Any such approach can be
considered a partial solution at best, particularly given the usability
challenges.
One voting system, Civitas [34], based on a protocol by Juels,
Catalano and Jakobsson [57], allows voters to vote with fake creden-
tials to lead the coercive adversary into believing the desired vote
was cast. Note that the protocol must enable universal verification
of the tally from a list of votes cast with both genuine and fake
credentials, proving to the verifier that only the ones with genuine
credentials were tallied, without identifying which ones they were.
Open problem:
• Can we develop cryptographic techniques that provide fully
coercion resistant remote voting?
3.3.5 Cryptographic Solutions in Complex Elections
Cast-as-intended verification based on creating and then challeng-
ing a vote works regardless of the scheme (e.g. Benaloh challenges).
Cut-and-choose based schemes such as Prêt à Voter and Scantegrity
II need to be modified to work.
Both uses of end-to-end verifiable voting schemes in government
elections, the Takoma Park run of Scantegrity II and the Victo-
rian run of Prêt à Voter, used IRV (and one used STV). Verifiable
IRV/STV counting that doesn’t expose individual votes to the Italian
attack has been considered [15], but may not be efficient enough for
use in large elections in practice, and was not employed in either
practical implementation.
Open problems:
• Is usable cast-as-intended verification for complex voting
methods possible?
3.3.6 Blockchains as a Cryptographic Solution
Blockchains provide an unexpectedly effective answer to a long-
standing problem in computer science—how to form a consistent
public ledger in a dynamic and fully distributed environment in
which there is no leader and participants may join and leave at
any time [75]. In fact, the blockchain process effectively selects a
"random" leader at each step to move things forward, so this seems
at first to be a natural fit for elections—citizens post their preferences
onto a blockchain and everyone can see and agree upon the outcome
of the election.
However, blockchains and elections differ in significant ways.
Elections typically already have central authorities to play the lead-
ership role, an entity that administrates the election: what will be
voted on, when, who is allowed to vote, etc.). This authority can
also be tasked with publishing a public ledger of events. Note that
(as with blockchains) there need be no special trust in a central
authority as these tasks are all publicly observable. So to begin with,
by simply posting something on a (digitally signed) web page, an
election office can do in a single step what blockchains do with a
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cumbersome protocol involving huge amounts of computation.
Blockchains are inherently unaccountable. Blockchain miners are
individually free to include or reject any transactions they desire—
this is considered a feature. To function properly in elections, a
blockchain needs a mechanism to ensure all legitimate votes are
included in the ledger, which leads to another problem: there’s
also no certainty in traditional blockchain schemes. Disputes are
typically resolved with a "longest chain wins" rule. Miners may have
inconsistent views of the contents of blockchains, but the incentives
are structured so that the less widely held views eventually fade
away—usually. This lack of certainty is not a desirable property in
elections.
In addition to lacking certainty and accountability, blockchains
also lack anonymity. While modifications can be made to blockchain
protocols to add anonymity, certainty, and accountability, balancing
these modifications on top of the additional constraints of voting is
difficult, and simpler solutions already exist as we discuss.
In short, blockchains do not address any of the fundamental
problems in elections, and their use actually makes things worse.
4. Current Solutions
I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the
president next year.
Walden O’Dell, Diebold CEO, 2003
Below we provide a brief analysis of several real-world voting
systems developed by the scientific community. These systems use
the properties discussed in Sections 2 and 3. We include both poll-
site and remote systems. This collection is by no means exhaustive,
but hopefully the abundance of verifiable, evidence-based voting
systems will convince the reader that there are significant technolog-
ical improvements that can greatly improve election security. Our
analysis is graphically represented in Table 1.
4.1 Pollsite Systems
The systems below were developed specifically with the require-
ments from Section 2 in mind. As such, all satisfy the end-to-end
verifiability criteria from Section 2.1.3, and to a varying degree
provide collection accountability, receipt-freeness, and coercion
resistance.
4.1.1 Prêt à Voter
1239
Bob
Alice
Carol
1239
X
1769
Alice
Carol 3792
1239
Bob
Alice
Carol
1239
X
1769
Alice
Carol 3792
Figure 1: Marked ballots in Prêt-à-Voter [87] (left) and Scant-
egrity [31] (right).
Prêt à Voter [87] ballots list the candidates in a pseudo-random
order, and the position of the voter’s mark serves as an encryption
of the vote. The ballot also carries an encryption of the candidate
ordering, which can be used, with the mark position, to obtain the
vote. Voters can audit ballots to check that the random candidate
order they are shown matches the encrypted values on their ballot.
vVote In the 2014 state election the Australian state of Victoria
conducted a small trial of end-to-end verifiable pollsite voting, using
a system called vVote derived from Prêt à Voter [38].
4.1.2 Scantegrity
The Scantegrity [31, 32] voter marks ballots that are very similar
to optical scan ballots, with a single important difference. Each
oval has printed on it, in invisible ink, a confirmation code—the
encryption corresponding to this vote choice. When voters fill the
oval with a special pen, the confirmation number becomes visible.
The same functionality can be achieved through the use of scratch-
off surfaces.
Scantegrity II was used by the City of Takoma Park for its munic-
ipal elections in 2009 and 2011 [26], the first secret-ballot election
for public office known to use an E2E voting system within the U.S.
4.1.3 VeriScan
VeriScan [13], like Scantegrity, uses optical scan ballots. But
the ballots are ordinary – using regular ink – and are filled by
voters using ordinary pens. Optical scanners used by VeriScan are
augmented to hold the ballot deposited by a voter and to print a
receipt consisting of an encryption of the selections made by the
voter (or a hash thereof).
Once the receipt has been given to the voter by the scanner, the
voter can instruct the scanner to either retain the ballot or to return
the ballot to the voter. A returned ballot should be automatically
marked as no longer suitable for casting and effectively becomes a
challenge ballot as in STAR-Vote (below).
All encrypted ballots – whether cast or retained by a voter – are
posted to a public web page where they can be checked against voter
receipts. The cast ballots are listed only in encrypted form, but the
retained ballots are listed in both encrypted and decrypted form so
that voters can check the decryptions against their own copies of the
ballots.
4.1.4 STAR-Vote
STAR-Vote [9] is an E2E-V, in-person voting system designed
jointly with Travis County (Austin), Texas, and is scheduled for
wide-spread deployment in 2018. STAR-Vote is a DRE-style touch-
screen system, which prints a human-readable paper ballot which is
deposited into a ballot box. The system also prints a receipt that can
be taken home. These two printouts serve as evidence for audits.
STAR-Vote encodes a Benaloh-style cast-or-spoil question [11]
as the depositing of the ballot into the ballot box. Each voting
machine must commit to the voter’s ballot without knowing if it will
be deposited and counted or spoiled and thereby challenged.
STAR-Vote posts threshold encrypted cast and spoiled ballots to
a web bulletin board. Voters can then check that their cast ballots
were included in the tally, or that the system correctly recorded
their vote by decrypting their challenged ballots. STAR-Vote is
collection accountable only to the extent that paper receipts and
ballot summaries are resistent to forgery. It is coercion resistant and
software independent, and allows for audits of its paper records.
4.1.5 PPAT
While many of the above schemes provide most of the required
properties laid out in Section 2, most do not account for everlasting
privacy. However, by integrating the Perfectly Private Audit Trail
(PPAT) [39], many of the previously discussed systems can attain
everlasting privacy. Notably, PPAT can be implemented both with
mixnet schemes like Scantegrity [31] and Helios [2] as well as with
homomorphic schemes like that used in STAR-Vote [9].
4.2 Remote Systems
4.2.1 Remotegrity
The Remotegrity [108] voting system specification provides a
layer over local coded voting systems specifications to enable their
9
fie
ld
ed
co
er
ci
on
re
sis
ta
nc
e
ev
er
la
sti
ng
pr
iv
ac
y
so
ftw
ar
e i
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e
ta
ke
-h
om
e e
vi
de
nc
e
ba
llo
t c
as
t a
ss
ur
an
ce
co
lle
ct
io
n
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e
ve
rifi
ab
ly
ca
st-
as
-in
te
nd
ed
ve
rifi
ab
ly
co
lle
ct
ed
-a
s-
ca
st
ve
rifi
ab
le
co
un
te
d-
as
-c
ol
le
ct
ed
pa
pe
r/e
le
ct
ro
ni
c/
hy
br
id
w
rit
e-
in
s s
up
po
rte
d
pr
ef
er
en
tia
l b
al
lo
ts
su
pp
or
te
d
Poll-site techniques in widespread use
Hand-counted in-person paper     # # #  #  7 p   
Optical-scan in-person paper     # # #  #  7 h   
DRE (with paper audit trail)   #  # # # G#7   7 h   
Paperless DRE   # # # # # # # # e   
Poll-site systems from research
Prêt-à-voter [87]  1  #   G#12     h #  
Scantegrity [31]  1  #   G#12     h G# G#
STAR-Vote [9] G#2  G#6   G#13 G#14    h # #
Wombat [85] G#3  G#6   G#13 G#14    h # #
VeriScan [13] #  G#6   G#13 G#14    h # G#
Scratch and Vote [5] #  #   G#12     h G# G#
MarkPledge [77] #  G#6        e # #
ThreeBallot [80] #     G#12   G#  h # #
Remote voting systems and techniques
Helios [2] G#3 #5 G#6   8 G# G#7    e # #
Remotegrity [108] G#1 # G#6   #     h # G#
Civitas [34] G#3  G#6 #  8 # G#    e G#  
Selene [88] #  G#6  # G#7     e #  
Norway [49]  #5 # # # # G#11 # # G#7 e   
Estonia [97]  #5 # # G#9 # # # # # e # #
iVote [54]  4 #5 # # # # # G#10 G#10 # e #  
Paper ballots returned by postal mail  #   # # # # #  7 p   
 = provides property # = does not provide property G# = provides property with provisions
1 Used in small trial elections
2 Pending deployment
3 Used in private sector elections
4 Absentee voting only
5 Allows multiple voting
6 Possible with PPAT
7 With sufficient auditing
8 Receipts sent by email
9 Temporary email receipt
10 Queryable (phone system)
11 Queryable (code sheets)
12 Enhanced with pre- and
post-election auditing
13 Enhanced with auditing
during elections
14 To the extent the paper
resists forgery
Table 1: Applying our threat model to fielded and proposed voting schemes — Note that certain features like credentialing and availability
are excluded, as these factors impact all systems in roughly equivalent ways. The Utah system has not been made available for rigorous
security analysis, and is excluded.
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use in a remote setting. It is the only known specification that
enables the voter to detect and prove attempts by adversaries to
change the remote vote.
Voters are mailed a package containing a coded-vote ballot and a
credential sheet. The sheet contains authorization codes and lock-in
codes under scratch-offs, and a return code. To vote, voters scratch-
off an authorization code at random and use it as a credential to
enter the candidate code. The election website displays the entered
information and the return code, which indicates to the voter that the
vote was received. If the website displays the correct information,
the voter locks it in with a random lock-in code. If not, the voter
uses another computer to vote, scratching-off another authorization
code. For voter-verifiability, voters may receive multiple ballots,
one of which is voted on, and the others audited.
The credential authority (an insider adversary) can use the creden-
tials to vote instead of the voter. If this happens, the voter can show
the unscratched-off surface to prove the existence of a problem.
Remotegrity thus achieves E2E-V, collection accountability, and
software independence. Since there is no secret ballot guarantee,
there is no coercion resistance.
Remotegrity was made available to absentee voters in the 2011
election of the City of Takoma Park, alongside in-person voting
provided by Scantegrity.
4.2.2 Helios
Helios [2, 3] is an E2E-V Internet voting system. Voters visit
a web page “voting booth” to enter their selections. After voters
review their ballots, each ballot is encrypted using a threshold key
generated during election set up.
Voters cast a ballot by entering credentials supplied for this elec-
tion. Alternatively, voters can anonymously spoil their ballots to
decrypt them, to show that their selections were accurately recorded.
Voters can cast multiple ballots with only the last one retained, as a
weak means of coercion mitigation.
When the election closes, the cast votes are verifiably tallied—
either using homomorphic tallying or a mixnet. Independent veri-
fiers have been written to check the tallying and decryptions of each
spoiled ballot. Confirmation that the vote is received is then emailed
to the voter. Helios is used for elections by a variety of universities
and professional societies including the Association for Computing
Machinery and the International Association for Cryptologic Re-
search. Helios lacks collection accountability, but is still E2E-V and
software independent through its spoil function.
4.2.3 Selene
Selene [88] is a remote E2E-V system that revisits the tracker
numbers of Scantegrity, but with novel cryptographic constructs to
counter the drawbacks. Voters are notified of their tracker after the
vote/tracker pairs have been posted to the web bulletin board, which
allows coerced voters to identify an alternative tracker pointing to the
coercer’s required vote. Voter verification is much more transparent
and intuitive, and voters are not required to check the presence of
an encrypted receipt. For the same reasons as Remotegrity, Selene
is software independent and provides collection accountability.
Open problems:
• Is there a cast-as-intended method that voters can execute
successfully without instructions from pollworkers?
• Is it possible to make E2E-V protocols simpler for election
officials and pollworkers to understand and administer?
5. Internet Voting
“People of Dulsford,” began Boris, “I want to assure you that as
your newly elected mayor I will not just represent the people
who voted for me ...”
“That’s good,” said Derrick, “because no-one voted for him.”
“But the people who didn’t vote for me as well,” said Boris.
There was a smattering of half-hearted clapping from the crowd.
R. A. Spratt, Nanny Piggins and the Race to Power
In this section we present the challenges of secure Internet voting
through a set of (possibly contradictory) requirements. No system
has addressed the challenges sufficiently so far, and whether it is
possible to do so remains an open problem. We begin by introduc-
ing prominent contemporary instances of I-voting as case studies.
Then we examine the Internet voting threat model, along the way
showing how these Internet systems have failed to adequately de-
fend themselves. We look at voter authentication, verification of
the correctness of a voting system’s output, voter privacy and coer-
cion resistance, protections against denial-of-service, and finally the
usability and regulatory constraints faced by voting systems.
One major roadblock faced exclusively by I-voting is the under-
lying infrastructure of the Internet. The primary security mecha-
nism for Internet communication is Transport Layer Security (TLS),
which is constantly evolving in response to vulnerabilities. For
instance, the website used in the iVote system was vulnerable to
the TLS FREAK [41] and LogJam [6] vulnerabilities. Researchers
discovered this during the election period and demonstrated that
they could exploit it to steal votes [54]. At the time, LogJam had
not been publicly disclosed, highlighting the risk to I-voting from
zero-day vulnerabilities. Internet voting systems must find ways to
rely on properties like software independence and E2E-V before
they can be considered trusted.
In 2015, the U.S. Vote Foundation issued an export report on the
viability of using E2E-verifiability for Internet voting [106]. The
first two conclusions of the report were as follows.
1. Any public elections conducted over the Internet must be
end-to-end verifiable.
2. No Internet voting system of any kind should be used for
public elections before end-to-end verifiable in-person voting
systems have been widely deployed and experience has been
gained from their use.
Many of the possible attacks on I-voting systems could be per-
formed on postal voting systems too. The main difference is the
likelihood that a very small number of people could automate the
manipulation of a very large number of votes, or a carefully chosen
few important votes, without detection.
5.1 I-voting in Government Elections
Estonia [43] Estonia’s I-voting deployment—the largest in the
world by fraction of the electorate—was used to cast nearly a third
of all votes in recent national elections [42]. The Estonian system
uses public key cryptography to provide a digital analog of the
“double envelope” ballots often used for absentee voting [43]. It
uses a national PKI system to authenticate voters, who encrypt and
digitally sign their votes via client-side software. Voters can verify3
3We use the term “verify” loosely in this subsection; these systems
provide no guarantee that what is shown when voters “verify” their
votes proves anything about the correctness of vote recording and
processing. see 2.1.
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that their votes were correctly received using a smartphone app, but
the tallying process is only protected by procedural controls [44].
The voting system does not provide evidence of a correct tally, nor
does it provide evidence that the vote was correctly recorded if
the client is dishonest. A 2013 study showed that the Estonian
system is vulnerable to vote manipulation by state-level attackers
and client-side malware, and reveals significant shortcomings in
officials’ operational security [97].
iVote [22] The largest online voting trial by absolute number of
votes occurred in 2015 in New South Wales, Australia, using a web-
based system called iVote. It received 280,000 votes out of a total
electorate of over 4 million. The system included a telephone-based
vote verification service that allowed voters to dial in and hear their
votes read back in the clear. A limited server-side auditing process
was performed only by auditors selected by the electoral authority.
Thus no evidence was provided that received votes were correctly
included in the tally. At election time, the electoral commission
declared that, “1.7% of electors who voted using iVote also used
the verification service and none of them identified any anomalies
with their vote.” It emerged more than a year later that 10% of
verification attempts had failed to retrieve any vote at all. This error
rate, extrapolated to all 280,000 votes, would have been enough to
change at least one seat.
Norway [49] In 2011 and 2013 Norway ran trials of an I-voting
system. In the 2013 trial, approximately 250,000 voters (7% of
the Norwegian electorate) were able to submit ballots online [95].
Voters are given precomputed encrypted return codes for the various
candidates they can vote for. Upon submitting a ballot, the voter
receives an SMS message with the return code computed for the
voter’s selections. In principle, if the return codes were kept private
by the election server, the voter knows the server correctly received
her vote. This also means that ballots must be associated with
the identity of those who cast them, enabling election officials to
possibly coerce or selectively deny service to voters. The voting
system did not provide publicly verifiable evidence of a correct tally.
Switzerland [29] In Switzerland, the Federal Chancellery has
produced a clear set of requirements. More stringent verifiability
properties come into force as a larger fraction of the votes are
carried over the Internet. Many aspects of this way of proceeding
are admirable. However, the final systems are dependent on a code-
verification system, and hence integrity depends on the proper and
secret printing of the code sheets. If the code-printing authorities
collude with compromised devices, the right verification codes can
be returned when the votes are wrong.
Utah [19] In March 2016 the Utah Republican party held its cau-
cus, running pollsite voting in addition to an online system. Voters
could register through a third-party website and have a voting creden-
tial sent to their phone via SMS or email. Any registered voter could
receive a credential, but as the site was unauthenticated, anyone
with a voter roll4 could submit any registered voter’s information
and receive that person’s credential. On the day of the election, said
credentials were used to log onto the website ivotingcenter.us to fill
out and submit ballots. The system provided voters with a receipt
code that voters could check on the election website. The system
does not provide evidence that the vote was correctly recorded if the
client is dishonest, nor does it provide evidence of a correct tally.
Election day saw many voters fail to receive their voting credentials
or not be able to reach the website to vote at all, forcing as many
as 13,000 of the 40,000 who attempted to register to vote online to
either vote in person or not vote at all [45].
4That is, a publicly available list of registered voters, their party
affiliations, home addresses, and other relevant information
All of these systems place significant trust in unverifiable pro-
cesses, at both client and server sides, leading to serious weaknesses
in privacy and integrity. Their faults demonstrate the importance
of a clear and careful trust model that makes explicit who does and
does not have power over the votes of others, and reinforce the
importance of providing convincing evidence of an accurate election
outcome.
5.2 E2E-V I-voting in Government Elections
Internet voting presents numerous challenges that have not been
adequately addressed. First among these is the coercion problem
which is shared with other remote voting systems in widespread use
today (such as vote-by-mail). However, I-voting exacerbates the
problem by making coercion and vote-selling a simple matter of a
voter providing credentials to another individual.
Client malware poses another significant obstacle. While E2E-
verifiability mitigates the malware risks by providing voters with al-
ternate means to ensure that their votes have been properly recorded
and counted, many voters will not avail themselves of these ca-
pabilities. We could therefore have a situation were a large-scale
fraud is observed by a relatively small number of voters. While the
detection of a small number of instances of malfeasance can bring
a halt to an election which provides collection accountability, the
required evidence can be far more fleeting and difficult to validate
in an Internet setting. An election should not be overturned by a
small number of complaints if there is no substantive evidence to
support these complaints.
Targeted denial-of-service is another serious unresolved threat to
I-voting. Ordinary denial-of-service (DoS) is a common threat on
the Internet, and means have been deployed to mitigate — although
not eliminate — these threats. The unique aspect in elections is that
while ordinary DoS can slow commerce or block access to a web site
for a period, the effects of a targeted DoS attack on an election can
be far more severe. Since voting paterns are far from homogeneous,
an attacker can launch a targeted DoS attack against populations and
regions which are likely to favor a particular candidate or position.
By merely making it more difficult for people in targeted populations
to vote, the result of an election can be altered. As yet, we have no
effective mitigations for such attacks.
Finally, as was observed in the U.S. Vote Foundation study [106],
we simply don’t yet have much experience with large-scale deploy-
ments of E2E-verifiable election systems in the simpler and more
manageable setting of in-person voting. It would be angerous to
jump directly to the far more challenging setting of Internet voting
with a heavy dependence on a technology that has not previously
been deployed at scale.
5.3 Alternatives to Internet Voting
There are numerous alternatives to Internet voting that can help
enfranchise voters who can not easily access a poll site on the day
of an election.
Early voting is in widespread use throughout the U.S. By extend-
ing the voting window from a single day to as much as three weeks,
voters who may be away or busy on the date of an election can be
afforded an opportunity to vote in person, at their convenience, at
a poll site with traditional safeguards. Early voting also mitigates
many of the risks of traditional systems since, for example, an equip-
ment failure ten days prior to the close of an election is far less
serious than one that takes place during a single day of voting.
Some U.S. jurisdictions have adopted a vote center system in
which voters may vote in person outside of their home precincts.
This option has been facilitated by the use of electronic poll books,
and it allows voters to, for instance, vote during a lunch break from
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work if they will be away from their homes during voting hours. The
vote center model could potentially be extended from the current
model of voters away from their home precincts but still within their
home counties by allowing voters to use any poll site in the state or
country. It would even be possible to establish remote voting kiosks
overseas in embassies, conslates, or other official sites, and roming
voting kiosks could be established with as little as two poll workers
and a laptop computer. Security and accountability in all of these
non-local voting scenarios can be greatly enhanced by the use of
E2E-verifiability.
Blank-ballot electronic delivery is another option which has
gained in popularity. While there are numerous risks in using the
Internet for casting of ballots, the risks a far less in simply providing
blank ballots to voters. Electronic delivery of blank-ballots can save
half of the round-trip time that is typical in absentee voting, and
traditional methods of ballot return can be used which are less sus-
ceptible to the large-scale attacks that are possible with full Internet
voting.
6. A Look Ahead
There is no remedy now to a process that was so opaque that it
could have been manipulated at any stage
Michael Meyer-Resende and Mirjam Kunkler, on the Iranian
2009 Presidential election
Voting has always used available technology, whether pebbles
dropped in an urn or marked paper put in a ballot box; it now uses
computers, networks, and cryptography. The core requirement, to
provide public evidence of the right result from secret ballots, hasn’t
changed in 2500 years.
Computers can improve convenience and accessibility over plain
paper and manual counting. In the polling place there are good
solutions, including Risk Limiting Audits and end-to-end verifiable
systems. These must be more widely deployed and their options for
verifying the election result must actually be used.
Many of the open problems described in this paper—usable and
accessible voting systems, dispute resolution, incoercibility—come
together in the challenge of a remote voting system that is verifiable
and usable without supervision. The open problem of a system
specification that (a) does not use any paper at all and (b) is based
on a simple procedure for voters and poll workers, will motivate
researchers for a long time. Perhaps a better goal is a hybrid system
combining paper evidence with some auditing or cryptographic
verification.
Research in voting brings together knowledge in many fields—
cryptography, systems security, statistics, usability and accessibility,
software verification, elections, law and policy to name a few—to
address a critical real-world problem.
The peaceful transfer of power depends on confidence in the
electoral process. That confidence should not automatically be
given to any outcome that seems plausible—it must be earned by
producing evidence that the election result is what the people chose.
Insisting on evidence reduces the opportunities for fraud, hence
bringing greater security to citizens the world over.
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